A
Note on the Legal Standards Applied in This Book
International
humanitarian law (IHL) must always balance between two poles. On
the one hand is the lawyerly desire to be legally precise, to be
technically accurate about frequently difficult concepts and distinctions
of law. On the other is the desire to codify a law to which ordinary
soldiers and their officers will have allegiance because they understand
it and its underlying humanitarian rationale.
Equally
important is the perception of the general public. In order to bring
this topic before the broadest possible audience, the intent behind
this book is to combine technical accuracy and readability.
As
legal editor, I accept the responsibility for the legal analysis
and rules of IHL promulgated in this volume. Individual authors
have retained their independent voices as to the facts and phenomena
that, frequently, they have witnessed. Independent authorial analysis
is more pronounced in the longer country and conflict articles,
such as those covering the Arab-Israeli wars, Cambodia, and the
Gulf War. The editors have generally let authors develop their own
statements of the circumstances, and social and political causes
of the conflicts. Still, insofar as is possible, I have sought to
draw my best estimation of their legal significance and status under
the terms of IHL. In our quest for accuracy and fairness we have
had the benefit of unstinting advice from many prominent legal authorities.
(See acknowledgements.) In the
case of articles written by prominent legal experts in IHL, we have
given them latitude to express individual judgements on difficult
or unsettled matters, while recognizing that not all issues are
settled. However, any errors of legal analysis or judgment are mine
alone.
Technical
accuracy versus simplification is not the only tension that faces
a book such as this. There is always the risk that for the sake
of clarity one suggests that there are always determinate rules
in IHL that yield plain and unwavering answers to any question of
application. IHL, like other bodies of law, contains important matters
whose scope and interpretation are susceptible to considerably different
readings. In short, what various sources urge as applicable law
is not always uniform, and it would in fact be surprising if it
were so. Of the differences that can arise, perhaps the most important
is between the aspirations of those who would like to see the rules
of armed conflict extended in one way or another and the defenders
of actual and traditional practices of States and their militaries.
In
the past, it would perhaps be fair to say, Western and U.S. journalists
tended to accept the characterization of law given by their own
militaries, or worse, never questioned the legality of military
actions. Today the world is filled with international nongovernmental
organizations, legal scholars, and many others seeking to influence
international public opinion and happy to offer their views on international
law. Often their views are presented (and often accepted) uncritically
as objective statements of law without consideration of contrary
opinions. This book does not attempt to resolve the issues and debates
between those with activist briefs and those closer to the status
quo.
Where
the law or its interpretation is unsettled or contested, we seek
to identify the controversy and not act as though it does not exist.
The
status of Additional Protocol I of 1977 requires a special note.
Protocol I has been very broadly accepted by States although the
United States and other significant military powers, including,
for example, Israel and Turkey, have not ratified. It is often relevant
to note which countries have taken on actual treaty obligations
and which have not. Additionally, ratifying States have also expressed
reservations and these, too, define a country's treaty obligations.
Some commentators and international activist organizations tend
to be impatient with questions of which countries have bound themselves
to the terms of Protocol I and which have not. Their view is that
a treaty that has achieved such wide acceptance must perforce constitute
customary international law, which as Professor Theodor Meron explains
in his article on customary law, binds even those States that have
not ratified it. Again, the intent of this book is to clarify rather
than resolve the issue.
It
is important to realize, however, that the United States, a State
whose practices matter significantly, has accepted large portions
of Protocol I as declaratory of customary international law on some
of the critical substantive matters of IHL including, for example,
the prohibitions on direct attack against civilians and indiscriminate
attack involving civilians.
Another
unsettled debate is over the weight to attach to the future of the
newly established International Criminal Court (ICC). Although this
book indicates how various IHL issues may be affected by the existence
of the ICC, by its Statute, adopted in Rome in 1998, and by the
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
the fact that the United States has chosen to remain outside the
ICC cannot be ignored. Whether the United States will eventually
join, or whether the world will move toward some two-tier system
in which most States at least nominally adhere to an international
adjudication system while the world's leading military power and
political guarantor of international stability stands apart, is
not known at this point. In the last analysis, however, State practices
still matter.
The
Rome Statute of the ICC is the most important revision of IHL since
the Additional Protocols of 1977. IHL is therefore on the cutting
edge of movements of profoundly larger import than simply conduct
upon the battlefield; those who say that the concept of sovereignty
is at issue in the proper role and scope of IHL are wholly correct.
This book aims to make accessible to the public, and to the journalists
who write about these matters for the public, the body of law that
stands at this cutting edge.

|