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THE LAW >

Willfulness
By A. P. V. Rogers

In trials for war crimes or grave breaches, the prosecution must generally prove not only that the accused did the act complained of but also that he intended the consequences of his act. This intent is usually referred to by lawyers as mens rea, criminal intent or basic intent.

If, for example, in attacking a military target, a commander causes unintended civilian casualties because of a weapons malfunction or faulty target intelligence, he would not be guilty of an offense because he lacked criminal intent, despite the consequences of his actions.

Even if treaty provisions are silent on the question of intent as in “taking of hostages,” basic intent must still be proved. If a soldier is ordered to take civilians from a battlefield village under armed guard to a town well away from the fighting and there hand them over to the garrison commander and it later transpires that they were being held as hostages to protect the military headquarters in that town from attack, his defense might be lack of criminal intent as he was unaware that the civilians were hostages and assumed they were being taken to a place of safety.

Often a grave breach provision of a treaty specifies the intent as willfulness, as in “willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment” or “willfully... making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack.” Or it may take the form of wantonness, as in “extensive destruction... of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.”

The terms willful and wanton include intentional or deliberate acts and also cases of recklessness. Criminal liability is not limited to positive acts. It can arise in the event of a failure to act when there is a duty to do so and the failure is either with intent that the consequences should follow or is due to recklessness about those consequences.

In the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on the Additional Protocols, willfulness is explained thus: the accused must have acted consciously and with intent, i.e., with his mind on the act and its consequences and willing them... : this encompasses the concepts of “wrongful intent” or “recklessness,” viz., the attitude of an agent who, without being certain of a particular result, accepts the possibility of it happening; on the other hand, ordinary negligence or lack of foresight is not covered, i.e., when a man acts without having his mind on the act or its consequences. However, negligence may suffice for disciplinary action under national law.

The statute of the International Criminal Court specifies that an accused person is only to be convicted if his offense was committed “with intent and knowledge.” An accused has intent if, in relation to conduct, he “means to engage in the conduct” and, in relation to a consequence, he “means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.” Knowledge means “awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.”

(See due process; wanton destruction; war crimes; willful killing.)