The
term war crimes evokes a litany
of horrific images-concentration camps, ethnic cleansing, execution
of prisoners, rape, and bombardment of cities. These images correspond
in many ways to the legal definitions of the term, but international
law draws lines that do not in all ways match our sense of the most
awful behavior.
War crimes are those violations of the laws of war --or international
humanitarian law (IHL)-- that incur individual criminal responsibility.
While limitations on the conduct of armed conflict date back at
least to the Chinese warrior Sun Tzu (sixth century b.c.e.), the
ancient Greeks were among the first to regard such prohibitions
as law. The notion of war crimes per se appeared more fully in the
Hindu code of Manu (circa 200 b.c.e.), and eventually made its way
into Roman and European law. The first true trial for war crimes
is generally considered to be that of Peter von Hagenbach, who was
tried in 1474 in Austria and sentenced to death for wartime atrocities.
By World War I, States had accepted that certain violations of the
laws of war --much of which had been codified in the Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907-- were crimes. The 1945 Charter of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg defined war crimes as "violations
of the laws or customs of war," including murder, ill-treatment,
or deportation of civilians in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment
of prisoners of war; killing of hostages; plunder of public or private
property; wanton destruction of municipalities; and devastation
not militarily necessary.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions, which codified IHL after World War
II, also marked the first inclusion in a humanitarian law treaty
of a set of war crimes --the grave breaches of the conventions.
Each of the four Geneva Conventions (on wounded and sick on land,
wounded and sick at sea, prisoners of war, and civilians) contains
its own list of grave breaches. The list in its totality is: willful
killing; torture or inhuman treatment (including medical experiments);
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; compelling
a prisoner of war or civilian to serve in the forces of the hostile
power; willfully depriving a prisoner of war or protected civilian
of the rights of a fair and regular trial; unlawful deportation
or transfer of a protected civilian; unlawful confinement of a protected
civilian; and taking of hostages. Additional Protocol I of 1977
expanded the protections of the Geneva Conventions for international
conflicts to include as grave breaches: certain medical experimentation;
making civilians and nondefended localities the object or inevitable
victims of attack; the perfidious use of the Red Cross or Red Crescent
emblem; transfer of an occupying power of parts of its population
to occupied territory; unjustifiable delays in repatriation of POWs;
apartheid; attack on historic monuments; and depriving protected
persons of a fair trial. Under the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol I, States must prosecute persons accused of grave breaches
or hand them over to a State willing to do so.
The grave breaches provisions only apply in international armed
conflicts; and they only apply to acts against so-called protected
persons or during battlefield activities. Protected persons are,
in general, wounded and sick combatants on land and sea, POWs, and
civilians who find themselves in the hands of a state of which they
are not nationals.
Most violations of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols
are not grave breaches. Of those not listed as grave breaches, many
are still considered war crimes, although in those cases States
do not have the same obligation to extradite or prosecute as they
do for grave breaches. Other nongrave breaches are not war crimes,
but simply illegal acts
for which only the violating State is responsible under international
law. To give one simple example, if the commander of a POW camp
failed to keep a record of all disciplinary punishments (a violation
of Article 96 of the Third Geneva Convention), he would likely not
be committing a war crime-although some may disagree. Distinguishing
among nongrave breaches to determine which are crimes is not an
exact science, though it would seem that the more serious nongrave
breaches do incur individual responsibility. (The U.S. military
maintains that all violations of the laws of war, including those
of the Geneva Conventions, are war crimes.)
Wartime atrocities not prohibited under the Geneva Conventions or
Additional Protocol I may nonetheless be war crimes under the customary
law rubric of "violations of the laws and customs of war" (the same
phrase as in the Nuremberg Charter). For interstate conflicts, states
agree that such war crimes include certain violations of the 1907
Hague Convention and Regulations, such as use of poisonous weapons,
wanton destruction of cities not justified by military necessity,
attacks on undefended localities, attacks on religious and cultural
institutions, and plunder of public and private property. The Statute
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) lists as war crimes for
international conflicts not only the grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, but some twenty-six serious violations of the laws
and customs of war, most of which have been considered by States
as crimes since at least World War II.
As for civil wars, unfortunately, international
law today has fewer rules regulating the conduct of internal conflicts,
which many States consider part of their domestic jurisdiction and,
consequently, there is a shorter list of war crimes. Additional
Protocol II of 1977, which contains basic rules for the conduct
of internal conflicts, has no criminal liability provisions, and
the reach of customary law war crimes is not as clear with respect
to such wars as it is for international wars. The Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia includes
"serious violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions"
(the one article of the Geneva Conventions that addresses civil
wars), as well as other rules to protect victims of armed conflict
and basic rules on methods of warfare. The tribunal defined a serious
violation as one that has grave consequences for its victims and
breaks a rule protecting important values. This would presumably
include violence to life or health (murder, ill-treatment, torture,
mutilation, corporal punishment, rape, enforced prostitution, indecent
assault), summary executions, hostage taking, collective punishment,
and pillage. This list, while shorter than the list of grave breaches
or other interstate war crimes, nonetheless would cover some of
the most horrific acts during recent conflicts. The Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda includes as war crimes
serious violations of Common Article 3 as well as serious violations
of Additional Protocol II. The Statute of the ICC lists as war crimes
for internal conflicts four serious violations of Common Article
3 (violence to life and person, outrages upon personal dignity,
hostage taking, and summary executions), as well as twelve serious
violations of the laws and customs of war (e.g., attacks on civilians,
pillage, rape, or mutilation).
Though perhaps an obvious point, it should be noted that the laws
of war only cover atrocities during armed conflict. They exclude
many of the worst abuses of this century, such as Stalin's purges
and destruction of the Kulaks, most of the Khmer Rouge's terror,
and Mao's forced collectivizations. While these atrocities are international
crimes --crimes against humanity,
or, in some cases, genocide-- they are
not war crimes.
Finally, the creation of a body of law criminalizing certain violations
of the laws of war does not mean that war criminals will actually
be prosecuted. This remains a matter for States and, increasingly,
the United Nations and other international organizations. The Geneva
Conventions require all parties to search for and either extradite
or try all persons suspected of having committed grave breaches.
And international law gives all States the legal right to prosecute
war criminals under the theory of universal jurisdiction. While
States have at times prosecuted war criminals (e.g., the U.S. trial
of the My Lai offenders), the more pervasive pattern, despite the
obligations of the Geneva Conventions, is either mere administrative
punishment or impunity. The ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and
Rwanda have jurisdiction over both grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and other crimes committed in these particular conflicts,
and the ICC will, as noted, have jurisdiction over most war crimes.
(See
international vs. internal armed
confilct)
Steven
R. Ratner is a professor of law at the University of Texas, Austin,
and a Fulbright Senior Scholar and Asser Research fellow at the
T.M.C. Asser Institute in The Hague. He is coauthor of Accountability
for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg
Legacy (Oxford University Press, 1997).

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