Ten
months after NATO troops took charge of security in Bosnia-Herzegovina
under the Dayton peace accords, a reporter for the Boston Globe
toured northern Bosnia in search of indictees charged by the Hague
War Crimes Tribunal.
In the British-controlled northwest sector, the former commander
of the notorious Omarska concentration camp was employed as deputy
police chief in Omarska, and three other Hague indictees were on
the roster as policemen. In Bosanski Samac, in the American sector,
an indictee sat down for an interview in his office where he worked
as the town's top official. That was October 1996. In the weeks
that followed, reporters visiting Foca, southern Bosnia, in the
French zone, spotted Bosnian Serbs indicted for systematic rape
making the rounds of cafés and bars; others visiting Vitez,
central Bosnia, a Dutch-controlled area, sighted Bosnian Croats
indicted for massacres of civilians in free circulation.
Moreover, the two top Serb leaders, military commander Ratko Mladic
and political leader Radovan Karadzic, traveled freely on roads
patrolled by American and French troops. Both were indicted for
genocide, the most heinous crime in the lexicon.
The tolerance of impunity by leading world powers illustrates the
central problem of the laws of armed conflict: their implementation
relies entirely on the will of political leaders. And none of them,
starting with the United States, chose in the first nine months
of their deployment to risk a life to impose the laws which their
predecessors had drafted, signed, and ratified. Subsequently, they
arrested at least a half dozen indictees, while allowing Karadzic
to go into seclusion and then hiding.
All four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions oblige States to search
for and try those suspected of grave breaches, regardless of the
suspect's home country or the site of the crime. "Each High Contracting
Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged
to have committed, or to have ordered to have committed, such grave
breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality,
before its own courts," or hand them over "to another High Contracting
Party concerned." The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Commentary states that the suspect can be handed over to an international
criminal tribunal.
The United States, Britain, and France signed and ratified the conventions,
as did every other participant in the U.S.-led "Implementation Force"
(IFOR) and later "Stabilization Force" (SFOR). All States are also
obliged under UN Security Council resolution 827 to cooperate with
the tribunal and "take any measures necessary under their domestic
law" to comply with orders or requests for assistance from the tribunal.
NATO, however, devised, and later reinterpreted at its convenience,
its own rule for troops: IFOR troops will detain war criminals "only
when they confront them in the normal course of their assigned mission."
When challenged, top NATO authorities said States' obligations under
the Geneva Conventions were not their responsibility and might break
the consensus underlying the deployment.
Neither NATO, nor SHAPE (the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied
Powers in Europe), nor IFOR, as an entity, "is a party to the 1949
Geneva Conventions or Protocol I thereto," Max Johnson, the legal
adviser to the supreme allied commander in Europe, wrote Amnesty
International in March 1996. He added that IFOR, as a multinational
force under the operational command and control of NATO, "should
not be equated to a State in terms of international obligations."
IFOR, moreover, was "not an army of occupation" that was "free to
do anything it pleases." NATO's reluctance to arrest war criminals
reflected "the political realities in the region" and the fear that
a more aggressive posture "might not achieve consensus" among IFOR's
thirty troop-contributors.
It was the same "not my department" attitude of the United Nations.
"We go by the mandate. We are not authorized to enforce law and
order," Gen. Manfred Eisele, Assistant Secretary-General for Planning
in the Depart-ment of Peacekeeping Operations, said in a 1998 interview.
"The real responsibility for the apprehension of indicted war criminals
lies with the local authorities."
By such logic, the deputy chief of police in Omarska should arrest
himself.
In a sense, the arrival of NATO in Bosnia to replace the failed
UN mission gave the indictees a new lease on freedom. IFOR, under
its mandate to separate military forces, effectively prevented either
Bosnian political entity from arresting any indictee outside its
jurisdiction. Thus NATO,
in effect, took on the role of shielding indictees.
At the heart of NATO's stance was the reluctance of the U.S. executive
branch to risk the lives of U.S. ground troops. "There are obviously
political considerations involved in this issue [of whether IFOR
was obliged to arrest]," Judith A. Miller, the Pentagon's general
counsel stated in September 1996. But then she went on to reinterpret
the Geneva Conventions, ignoring universal jurisdiction against
grave breaches. "We read these provisions as applying to the territory
of the United States, not as a universal obligation or carte blanche
to search for alleged war criminals in the sovereign territory of
foreign countries," she told the American Bar Association.
The U.S. and NATO attitudes raise profound questions. Amnesty International
concluded that Miller's arguments "constitute nothing short of a
calculated policy of evasion of legal obligations imposed by international
law." Professor Diane Orentlicher of American University noted that
according to the logic stated by NATO official Johnson, "any State
could violate the Geneva Conventions with impunity merely by joining
other countries in a military alliance."
In fact, the legal case is only an excuse. "It's all political decisions
dressed up in legal rhetoric," said a knowledgeable Pentagon official.
(See
United Nations and the Geneva Conventions.)

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