Half
a century after Nuremberg, it is hard to remember that it was perfectly
intellectually acceptable during and after World War II to express
doubtas Arendt didthat Nazi horrors could rightly be
lumped under the rubric of municipal law. Morgenthau, in his blazing
anger, said, "its a question of attacking the German
mind." He did not shirk from harsh measures:
[W]hen
it gets down to it, it may be a question of taking this whole
S.S. group, because you cant keep the concentration camps
forever and deporting them somewhere out of Germany to
some other part of the world. Just taking them bodily. And I wouldnt
be afraid to make the suggestion just as ruthlessly as it is necessary
to accomplish the act.
Let
somebody else water it down.
In
another outburst, in a Treasury Department meeting in September
1944, Morgenthau proposed mass deportations of millions of Germans
on the precedent, of all things, of Turkish expulsions of
ethnic Greeks while Morgenthaus father, Henry Morgenthau Sr.
(see Constantinople chapter), was ambassador to the Ottoman Empire:
I
will give you people an example which I lived through in the eyes
of my father. One morning the Turks woke up and said, "We
dont want a Greek in Turkey". They didnt worry
about what the Greeks were going to do with them. They moved one
million people out.
They said, "We dont want any
more Greeks in Turkey".
Now,
whether it is one million, ten million, twenty million it still
has to be done. A whole population was moved. The people lived.
They got rehabilitated in no time. They moved them.
If
you can move a million, you can move twenty million; and you move
twenty million. It is just a question; no one has thought about
it. It seems a terrific task; it seems inhuman; it seems cruel.
We didnt ask for this war; we didnt put millions of
people through gas chambers. We didnt do any of these things.
They have asked for it
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Summary
of the remainder of the article:
The
Nuremberg trials of ex-Nazis provided high drama at every level.
Leading up to the drama in the courtroom were the intense theatrics
of moral, political, and legal conflict in FDR's inner circle,
polarized by Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Henry Stimson. Why not
summarily kill the Nazi leadership? Did they really deserve
the courtesy of a trial?
Should Germany be rebuilt, or pulverized into a pre-industrial
condition? Polls taken in 1942 reveal a marked lack of legalism
in the American public: typically fewer than 10% favored trials.
The Germans were ultimately accorded the benefits of legal procedure
as it had evolved in the United States but winning this
point was a hard battle, replete with intrigue, irony, and religious
tension. |

This excerpt is from Gary Bass' book, "Stay
the Hand of Vengence: The Politics of War Crimes
Tribunals ".
Click
here to order. |
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